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Should the Government Provide Jobs for Everyone? Societal Expectations and Their Impact on Labour Market Institutions and Outcomes[1]

Abstract: This study explores whether and to what extent voters expect the government to provide jobs for everyone who wants to work. It examines the link between voter expectations and the labour market situation. It finds that the stronger the expectation of the government to provide a job for everyone in the mid-1990s was, the worse the labour market situation is today. Two hypotheses inspired by the theory of public choice are proposed to explain this relationship: (1) societal expectations were not correlated with reforms of labour market institutions in the next two decades; (2) support for the idea of the government providing a job for everyone was significantly lower among the employed (who in many countries constituted the majority of voters) than among other groups, and this difference did not depend on the labour market situation. The empirical analysis is based on a set of 29 indicators of labour market institutions and covers countries included in the Role of Government survey for 1996–2016 — conducted as part of the International Social Survey Programme. The obtained results are largely consistent with the stated hypotheses.

Keywords: labour market institutions, labour market policy, full employment, individual preferences, expectations

JEL classification codes: D78, J21, L51

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Introduction

There are many studies that underline the importance of labour market institutions for the situation on the labour market [Boeri *et al*., 2015; Boeri, Van Ours, 2008; OECD, 2006], especially when it comes to its capability to absorb negative macroeconomic shocks [Blanchard, Wolfers, 2000; OECD, 2012]. However, much less is known about why these institutions are (or are not) reformed and to what extent some regulations may be socially desired despite their negative impact on the labour market [Boeri, 2010]. Surprisingly, although a growing number of studies have attempted to answer these questions [Boeri *et al*., 2012; Lucifora, Moriconi, 2015; Vindigni *et al*., 2015], few researchers have analysed the empirical data describing the expectations of labour market participants concerning the conducted policy [Alesina *et al*., 2015; Parlevliet, 2017]. Therefore, the goal of this study is to assess to what extent individual preferences may help to explain the heterogeneity of labour market institutions among countries over a period of 10 to 20 years and to analyse how strongly the current labour market situation affects these preferences.

The research is based on the Role of Government survey, which has been conducted five times for various countries, mostly highly developed ones (see Table A1 in the Appendix for a detailed list). The answer to the following question was treated as a main measure of individual preferences: *On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the government's responsibility to provide a job for everyone who wants one?* The analysis in the next section reveals a surprising relationship between answers to this question in 1996 and labour market outcomes in individual countries in 2012–2016. It turns out that the stronger the support for a full-employment policy among respondents was, the worse the current labour market outcomes are.

Many potential explanations can be proposed to explain this relationship. However, this study was focused on two complementary hypotheses that can be falsified empirically. They are formulated in the second section and falsified in the third and fourth sections. The third section presents the results of a correlation analysis between respondents' answers in the third wave (conducted predominantly in 1996) of the Role of Government study and labour market institutions at the time when the survey was conducted and two decades later. Meanwhile, the fourth section is devoted to a detailed analysis of the respondents' answers with the use of a multilevel logit model. The last section concludes. The Appendix presents the characteristics of the variables and details of the Role of Government survey.

Societal expectations and labour market outcomes

How individual preferences were measured

The study is based on the Role of Government survey, which was first carried out in 1985 as part of the International Social Survey Programme

[ISSP Research Group, 1992, 1999, 2008, 2018]. The subsequent waves were conducted predominantly in[2] 1990 (2nd), 1996 (3rd), 2006 (4th), and 2016 (5th)[3]. The survey was conducted mainly for highly developed countries, though some post-socialist and developing countries were also included. As the list of covered countries differed in each wave, it is presented in detail in Table A1 in the Appendix (with the exception of the first wave, which covered only six countries). The list, however, is not long, because the 3rd wave covered 24 countries, the 4th was conducted for 33, while the 5th wave comprised 28 countries. Therefore, in order to preserve as many observations as possible, it was decided not to exclude particular countries from the presented study to obtain an invariant geographic scope in the analysed period, but rather to conduct the estimates for all available observations in the particular waves.

This approach is justified by the fact that, depending on the type of the conducted analysis, various waves were employed in the study. The correlation analysis with current labour market outcomes presented in the following subsection was conducted with the help of the third and fourth waves respectively. The correlation analysis with labour market institutions, presented in the third section, was based on the third wave, which ensured both a long period of analysis (around two decades) and a satisfactory number of country observations. Finally, the analysis of individual data was predominantly based on the largest, fourth, wave, however, the third and fifth waves were also analysed as robustness checks.

In order to measure individual preferences, the following question was asked: *On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the government's responsibility to provide a job for everyone who wants one?* Respondents could choose from among the following answers: *Definitely should be*, *Probably should be*, *Probably should not be*, and *Definitely should not be*. Table A2 in the Appendix shows the distribution of answers to this question in each country and its connection with other questions in the survey[4]. This descriptive analysis reveals that respondents who chose *Definitely should be* or *Probably should be* were also in favour of making the government responsible for keeping prices under control, providing a decent standard of living for the unemployed, reducing income differences, and helping industry to grow. Moreover, they also urged greater spending on old-age pensions and unemployment benefits even at the expense of higher taxes. Thus, it can be conjectured that most respondents have in fact expressed their expectation to increase state interventionism by stating in the survey that they support the idea of providing a job for everyone.

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2 In some countries, the surveys were conducted a year or two earlier or later than stated in the article. However, the ISSP uses the dates 1990, 1996, 2006 and 2016 to title the waves. Therefore, this article will also cite these approximate dates to denote when the study was conducted.

3 As of this writing (June 2018), only preliminary results of the last wave were available.

4 It was decided to present these results only for the largest, fourth, wave. The same analysis was conducted for the third wave of the survey, which yielded similar results.

Correlation between societal expectations and labour market outcomes

Not surprisingly, responses to the question measuring individual preferences proved to be significantly correlated with the unemployment rate in the year when the study was conducted (see Figure 1, which is based on the 3rd wave conducted in 1996). Generally, the higher the unemployment rate when the study was conducted, the stronger was the expectation of the government to provide a job for everyone.

Figure 1. The relationship between the percentage of respondents agreeing with the idea of the government providing a job for everyone during the 3rd wave of the Role of Government study (1996) and the unemployment rate in the year when the study was conducted



Note: two asterisks (**) denote the 0.05 significance level.
Source: Own elaboration based on data from ISSP Research Group [1999] and ILO [2017].

Reponses to the question chosen to measure individual preferences also proved to be strongly correlated with current labour market outcomes. Table 1a presents estimates of the Pearson and Spearman rank correlation coefficients for eight indicators of such outcomes and the percentage of survey respondents who agreed with the statement that the government should provide a job for everyone (Table A3 in the Appendix presents the definitions and sources of the variables employed in the analysis). Table 1b shows analogous estimates of correlations for changes in labour market outcomes between the current period and the years when the study was conducted.

The obtained results reveal that there is a significant correlation between societal expectations of the government providing a job for everyone—expressed in 1996 or 2006-and the current employment-to-population ratio, labour force participation rate, unemployment rate and long-term unemployment rate as

well as unemployment among youth and the percentage of employees who do not worry about losing their job.

Table 1a. Cross-country correlation coefficients between the percentage of respondents agreeing with the idea of the government providing a job for everyone and future labour market outcomes

	Variable:	The percentage of respondents answering *Definitely should be* or *Probably should be* when asked whether the government should be responsible for providing a job for everyone					
	Wave:	3rd wave (1996)			4th wave (2006)		
Variable:	Years of observation:	Spearman	Pearson	N	Spearman	Pearson	N
Employment to pop. ratio	Average value over 2012–2016	–0.49**	–0.5**	24	–0.45***	–0.51***	32
Labour force par. rate		–0.39*	–0.39*		–0.45***	–0.45**	32
NEET		0.34	0.24		0.43**	0.42**	29
Unemployment rate		0.37*	0.37*		0.36**	0.37**	32
Long-term unemp. rate		0.42**	0.44**		0.38**	0.43**	32
Youth unemployment rate		0.44**	0.39*		0.43**	0.43**	31
Employment security	2015	–0.23	–0.17	13	0.02	0.09	20
Job security		–0.59**	–0.59**		–0.39*	–0.4*	

Note: Spearman – Spearman's rank correlation coefficient, Pearson – Pearson's correlation coefficient, N – number of observations. Asterisks denote significance levels: *** – 0.01, ** – 0.05, * – 0.1. Analogous estimates were conducted for the percentage of respondents who declared that the government *definitely should be* responsible for providing a job for everyone; the results were very similar and are available upon request.

Source: Own elaboration. The list of analysed countries is presented in Table A1, while the definitions and sources of variables are given in Table A3 in the Appendix.

Table 1b. Cross-country correlation coefficients between the percentage of respondents agreeing with the idea of the government providing a job for everyone and changes in labour market outcomes

	Variable:	The percentage of respondents answering *Definitely should be* or *Probably should be* when asked whether the government should be responsible for providing a job for everyone					
	Wave:	1996 (3rd wave)			2006 (4th wave)		
Variable:	Years of observation:	Spearman	Pearson	N	Spearman	Pearson	N
Employment to pop. ratio	2012–2016 average / 1994–1998 average	0.2	0.28	23	0.13	0.07	32
Labour force par. rate		0.1	0.2	23	0.14	0.15	31
NEET		n/a	n/a	0	–0.18	–0.18	24
Unemployment rate		–0.02	0.01	24	–0.1	–0.02	32
Long-term unemploy. rate		0.07	–0.21	19	–0.18	–0.16	28
Youth unemployment rate		–0.13	–0.11	23	–0.05	0.04	32

Note: Changes in labour market outcomes were calculated as the ratio of the average level of each variable in 2012–2016 to its average level in 1994–1998. Other notes are the same as for Table 1a.

Source: see Table 1a.

Moreover, as the results presented in Table 1b indicate, societal expectations did not lead to any significant change in the situation over the years. It can therefore be concluded that societal expectations of the government to provide a job for everyone did not translate into any noticeable progress in achieving the aim of full employment in countries covered by the Role of Government survey over the years.

Research hypotheses

The public choice literature gives many suggestions as to why the government may fail to satisfy the needs of labour market participants. First, expectations may be impossible to meet due to economic constraints [Drazen, 2000: 622–624]. In many cases, only the second-best solutions can be implemented on a labour market characterised by more severe informational asymmetries, externalities, search frictions and structural mismatches than other markets [Boeri, Van Ours, 2008: 19]. Moreover, some policies might be difficult to implement due to their costs. This may especially be the case in post-socialist countries [Cazes, Nesporova, 2003; Lehmann, Muravyev, 2012] where expectations of state interventionism are the highest (see Figure 1 or Table 3). Governments have also faced the problem of incomplete information. During the last 20 years many contradictory recommendations have been formulated concerning government policy on the labour market [Blanchard *et al*., 2006; Boeri *et al*., 2015; European Commission, 2006; Keune, Serrano, 2014; Méda, 2014]. As a result, decision makers have received conflicting signals about an optimal policy. This problem is strengthened by interaction effects between various institutions [Algan, Cahuc, 2009; Lehmann, Muravyev, 2012; Woźniak-Jęchorek, 2013]. This means that the introduction of the same regulations may have a different impact on labour market outcomes in various countries, depending on already existing labour market institutions, both formal and informal.

What's more, the required reforms might have been opposed by influential interest groups. In the case of the labour market, it is often assumed that the strongest pressure on the government can be put by the employed [Lucifora, Moriconi, 2015; Neugart, 2008; Saint-Paul, 1996]. It is argued that this group is against reforms aimed at increasing the employability of outsiders when they expect that these changes may increase their affective job insecurity[5] or decrease their net wages. In consequence, governments often decide to propose limited reforms targeted at the margin of the labour market [Boeri, Garibaldi, 2007; Curto-Grau, 2017; Eichhorst, Marx, 2011; Emmenegger, 2014: 195–275].

The presented theoretical considerations make it possible to formulate the first hypothesis stating that societal expectations concerning the government's

[5] Following Anderson and Pontusson [2007], affective job insecurity is understood as the extent to which an individual worries about losing a job. It is a function of three elements: an individual's estimate of the probability of losing a job, an estimate of the probability of finding another job, and access to sources of income that do not depend on finding another job.

responsibility to provide a job for everyone expressed around 1996 were not significantly correlated with labour market institution reforms over the two decades that followed.

However, some authors argue that employed voters have in fact various levels of affective job insecurity and, in consequence, different policy preferences [Anderson, Pontusson, 2007]. The level of job insecurity depends on personal characteristics, especially job-specific and general human capital [Saint-Paul, 2002; Vindigni *et al*., 2015], the type of employment contract [Clark, Postel-Vinay, 2009], someone's occupation and the sector in which they operate [Fossati, 2014], and labour market institutions [Anderson, Pontusson, 2007; Giannelli *et al*., 2012]. The sense of job insecurity may also depend on the current labour market situation [Berglund *et al*., 2014; Blekesaune, 2007; Singer, 2013]. This means that the difference between some employed voters and other labour market participants in how they view reforms may decrease as the economic situation changes. As a result, decision makers may have the opportunity to go ahead with reforms that were previously blocked by rigid political constraints.

However, in order to explain the relationship between societal preferences and labour market outcomes described in the previous subsection, it may be assumed that the interaction between the preferences of the employed and the current labour market situation has little significance and that these preferences are predominantly determined by the personal characteristics of individuals that are largely time-invariant. In consequence, the second research hypothesis indicates that the employed support the idea of the government's responsibility to provide a job for everyone to a significantly lesser extent than other groups of voters and that this difference does not depend on the current situation on the labour market. This means that even during an economic downturn there is no majority that has one common preference related to what state intervention should look like on the labour market, which allows the government to propose only limited reforms, if any.

Societal expectations and labour market institutions

The next step of the analysis was based on a set of 29 indicators of labour market institutions. The aim was to verify whether individual support for providing a job for everyone expressed around 1996 was correlated with the labour market institutional framework existing at the time of the survey as well as with the current framework. Another objective was to assess the correlation with changes in that framework between these two moments. The results of the analysis are presented in Table 2, while a description of the variables is given in Table A3 in the Appendix.

The analysis was based on the third wave of the study, because the previous waves were conducted for an insufficient number of countries (six countries in the 1st wave, nine in the 2nd). Meanwhile, the fourth wave was carried out

just before the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008, and it may be argued that some socially expected reforms could not be introduced after this wave, not so much due to a lack of political consensus, but because of economic constraints. Moreover, as the OECD [2012] indicates, the responsiveness of the labour market situation in particular countries to the crisis was determined by the institutional framework existing before 2008. Thus, it was decided to base this analysis exclusively on the third wave (conducted in 1996), which ensured both a long period of analysis (around two decades) and an acceptable amount of country observations (see Table 2 for details).

Table 2a. Cross-country correlation coefficients between a preference for providing a job for everyone in and around 1996 and changes in labour market institutional indicators since 1996

Indicator of labour market institutions:	Years of obs.	Correlation coefficients:			Indicator of labour market institutions:	Years of obs.	Correlation coefficients:		
		Spearman	Pearson	N			Spearman	Pearson	N
EPL	1995–2013	–0.14	–0.32	20	Union cov.	1995–2013	–0.28	–0.32	16
EPR		–0.6***	–0.56**	20	Union density		–0.43**	–0.45**	23
EPT		–0.17	–0.18	20	Coord. of wage setting	1995–2015	0.0	–0.03	22
EPC		–0.35	–0.08	20	ALMP	1995–2015	0.49*	0.38	17
LMR	1995–2014	0.11	0.11	20	PLMP	1995–2014	0.02	0.24	17
Tax	1995–2015	0.15	0.06	19	National min. wage	1996–2015	–0.04	0.02	24
PTR	2001–2015	0.23	0.24	16	Min. wage to mean		0.32	0.4	15
Unemployment benefits NRR	2001–2015	–0.16	–0.27	16	Min. wage to median		0.34	0.37	13
Unemployment benefits cov.	1996–2005	0.12	0.1	19	Min. wage to average	1996–2005	0.19	0.26	14
Unemployment benefits GRR		0.03	0.1	21	CIRI	1996–2011	0.15	0.14	24

Note: Spearman – Spearman's rank correlation coefficient, Pearson – Pearson's correlation coefficient, N – number of observations. Asterisks denote significance levels: *** – 0.01, ** – 0.05, * – 0.1.

The correlation coefficients were estimated for the percentage of respondents that chose the answer *Definitely should be* or *Probably should be* to the question whether the government should be responsible for providing a job for everyone in the 3rd wave of the survey (1996). Analogous estimates were conducted for the percentage of respondents who declared only that the government *Definitely should be* responsible for providing a job for everyone. The results were similar and are available upon request.

Changes in labour market institutions were estimated as $inst_t/inst_{t-\tau}$ where $inst_t$ is the contemporary value of an institutional indicator and $inst_{t-\tau}$ describes the institution in 1996. The exceptions were *EPL, EPR, EPT, EPC, National min. wage* and *Coord. of wage setting*, where the differences were expressed as $inst_t - inst_{t-\tau}$ in order to avoid dividing by zero.

The third wave of the Role of Government survey was conducted for 24 countries. However, it was not possible to collect the values for all institutional indicators for all of these countries in 1996 and 2015. Therefore, it was decided to collect data also for some surrounding years. The column "Years of obs." indicates the years of earliest and latest observation for each calculation. Moreover, it was decided not to calculate several-year averages for individual institutions because in many cases such averages would have been calculated only with the use of a single year's observation, which has no justification.

Source: Own elaboration. The list of the analysed countries is presented in Table A1, while the definitions and sources of the variables are given in Table A3 in the Appendix.

However, the number of observations was still perceived as too small to employ complex econometric models. As a result, it was decided once more to estimate the cross-country correlation coefficients. Although the correlation analysis does not make it possible to reveal the underlying cause-and-effect relationship, it can be used to falsify the first hypothesis. That is because such analysis makes it possible to identify some common cross-country patterns, for instance the adoption of a policy consistent with the "flexicurity" approach. Such an approach was recommended by the OECD as early as 1994 [OECD, 1994] and by the European Commission in the 2000s [2006, 2007]. Therefore, it can be assumed that it was known to all governments in the analysed period and could be introduced by all of them in response to the societal expectation to provide a job for everyone. The identification of such a pattern would be an argument to reject the first hypothesis. Moreover, the correlation analysis makes it possible to indicate which institutions can be a promising subject for further, more detailed, analysis that would allow researchers to reveal the underlying cause-and-effect relationships.

In the presented study, it was possible to calculate changes in a set of 20 indicators over a period of at least 10 years (see Table 2a for the full list of indicators and Table A3 in the Appendix for the definitions and sources). Only three of the 20 indicators turned out to be significantly correlated with the societal expectations to provide a job for everyone expressed in 1996. The indicators included employment protection legislation for employees working on regular contracts (EPR), union density, and expenditure on active labour market policy (ALMP). However, the result for this last indicator is only confirmed by the Spearman rank correlation coefficient and only at the 0.1 significance level.

Although the relationship with changes in employment protection legislation between 1996 and 2013 is negative, it can still be stated that the higher the support for providing a job for everyone around 1996 was, the greater was the strictness of firing and hiring regulations in both 1996 and 2013 (see Table 2b and 2c). The relationship with the contemporary strictness of labour market regulations is also confirmed by a statistically significant correlation with other indicators: *LMR*, *LFI*, *GC hiring and firing*, *GC labour relations* and *GC pay to productivity* (see Table 2c for the results and Table A3 in the Appendix for precise definitions). This suggests that, although some governments have tried to follow the recommendations of many economists and organisations [Boeri,

2010; European Commission, 2006; Kwiatkowski, Włodarczyk, 2017] and increased labour market flexibility, their efforts have not substantially decreased the differences among countries in terms of hiring and firing regulations.

Table 2b. Cross-country correlation coefficients between a preference for providing a job for everyone and levels of labour market institutional indicators in 1996 and surrounding years

Indicator of labour market institutions:	Years of obs.	Correlation coefficients:			Indicator of labour market institutions:	Years of obs.	Correlation coefficients:		
		Spearman	Pearson	N			Spearman	Pearson	N
EPL	1995–1998	0.64***	0.65***	21	Union density	1995–1997	0.17	0.2	24
EPR		0.75***	0.76***	21	Coord. of wage setting	1995	0.07	0.16	22
EPT		0.49**	0.48***	21	ALMP	1995–1996	–0.22	–0.07	20
EPC		0.26	0.16	21	PLMP		0.19	0.25	17
LMR	1995	–0.49**	–0.51**	20	National min. wage	1996	0.15	0.01	24
Tax	1995–2000	0.42**	0.49**	23	Min. wage to mean	1996–2000	–0.23	–0.24	17
Tax N.	1988–1995	0.39	0.27	12	Min. wage to median		–0.23	–0.2	13
PTR	2001	0.15	0.1	16	Min. wage to average	1996	–0.58**	–0.44	14
Unemployment benefits NRR	2001	0.06	0.12	16	Labour rights	1996	0.01	0.17	24
Unemployment benefits cov.	1996	–0.21	–0.23	20	Labour rights law		0.17	0.27	24
Unemployment benefits GRR		0.01	0.04	21	Labour rights practice		0.05	0.05	24
Union cov.	1995–1997	0.43*	0.38	16	CIRI	1996	–0.33	–0.27	24

Note: as in Table 2a, except that the estimates were conducted for the institutional indicators in and around 1996, and not for changes in the indicators.

Sources: see Table 2a.

As far as the relationship with active labour market policy is concerned, increasing expenditure on this type of policy may be seen as a way of satisfying individual expectations to provide a job for everyone. At the same time, these expectations turned out to be positively and significantly correlated with the level of taxes (variable *Tax* in Table 2b and 2c). Although taxes are needed to finance labour market policy, a high tax wedge may be counterproductive as far as the aim of providing a job for everyone is concerned[6] [Nickell, 2006].

[6] It should, however, be noted that the effects of the tax wedge also depend on its structure [Boeri, Van Ours, 2008: 81–100]. This is not captured by the *Tax* variable, which measures the tax wedge

Moreover, a detailed analysis reveals that the relationship with changes in ALMP is driven by the Czech Republic and Hungary, because it becomes insignificant when these two countries are removed from the data set. The results also indicate that there is a negative relationship with changes in the union density rate (UD), but a detailed analysis of the data reveals that this is a consequence of a significant decrease in union membership in the post-socialist countries during the transition period [Lehmann, Muravyev, 2012].

Table 2c. Cross-country correlation coefficients between a preference for providing a job for everyone in and around 1996 and contemporary levels of labour market institutional indicators

Indicator of labour market institutions:	Years of obs.	Correlation coefficients:			Indicator of labour market institutions:	Years of obs.	Correlation coefficients:		
		Spearman	Pearson	N			Spearman	Pearson	N
EPL	2013	0.68***	0.68***	21	PTR	2015	0.34	0.2	21
EPR		0.66***	0.71***	21	Unemployment benefits NRR	2015	–0.28	–0.14	21
EPT		0.62***	0.49***	21	Union cov.	2011–2013	0.08	0.12	19
EPC		0.13	0.12	21	Union density		–0.19	–0.11	23
LMR	2014	–0.65***	–0.6***	24	Coord. of wage setting	2015	0.1	0.15	22
LFI	2015	–0.58***	–0.65***	24	ALMP	2011–2015	0.32	0.27	20
GC hiring and firing	2015	–0.37*	–0.42***	24	PLMP	2011–2014	0.17	0.29	20
GC labour relations		–0.53***	–0.45***	24	National min. wage	2010–2015	0.09	0.03	24
GC pay to productivity		–0.66***	–0.59***	24	Min. wage to mean	2015	0.0	0.13	17
GC wage setting		–0.16	–0.16	24	Min. wage to median		0.11	0.2	16
Tax	2015	0.52**	0.51**	19	CIRI	2011	–0.25	–0.21	24

Note: as in Table 2a, except that the estimates were conducted for the contemporary levels of institutional indicators, not for changes in them.

Sources: see Table 2a.

In the case of changes in other institutions, the correlation coefficients proved to be small and insignificant. As a result, the governments' response to voter expectations expressed in the analysed countries in 1996 can be evaluated as limited. It predominantly focused on decreasing differences among countries in terms of employment protection legislation for permanent contracts and (in some cases) increasing expenditure on active labour market policy, an

only for a typical employee. Therefore, it cannot be concluded that the high level of the *Tax* variable necessarily meant a low level of employment in the analysed countries.

approach that can be interpreted as an attempt to adopt a "flexicurity" policy. However, societal expectations did not prove to be significantly correlated with changes in the 17 other institutional indicators that were also analysed. Therefore, it can be concluded that these arguments are not robust although the obtained results give some arguments to reject the first hypothesis stating that societal expectations expressed in the survey in 1996 were not correlated with labour market institution reforms in the next two decades.

Who wants to provide a job for everyone?

Data and Methods

The aim of the next step of analysis was to check whether those employed were significantly less supportive than other groups of voters of the idea that the government should provide a job for everybody, and whether this difference depended on the current labour market situation.

The study was predominantly based on individual data obtained from the largest, fourth, wave (conducted around 2006) of the Role of Government survey [ISSP Research Group, 2008] and covered more than 37,000 respondents from 33 countries. However, this analysis was also carried out, as a robustness check, for the smaller third and fifth waves (conducted in 1996 and 2016 respectively). As of this writing (June 2018), only preliminary data (with many missing observations) for the fifth wave were available. Moreover, it may be argued that the societal expectations expressed in 2016 were not representative of the whole analysed period of 1996–2016. Therefore, despite the fact that the fifth wave is more up to date, it was not used as a basis for the main estimates.

Originally, the dependent variable was an ordinal variable with four categories. However, in some countries the number of respondents that chose the answer *Definitely should not be* was so small that it was decided to combine it with the answer *Probably should not be*. As a result, only three possible categories of the dependent variable were analysed: *Definitely should be*, *Probably should be*, and *Probably or definitely should not be*.

The data set has a hierarchical structure where the dependent variable can vary both among countries (level 2) and among individuals within countries (level 1). The sources of the employed variables are presented in Table A3 in the Appendix along with a short description. The main models rely on the two main variables defined at the country level: legal origins and the relative unemployment rate. The legal origin indicators are taken from a study by La Porta *et al*. [1999], which, in contrast to later work by these authors [La Porta *et al*., 2008], brings together all post-socialist countries into one group. The relative unemployment rate is defined as the ratio of the unemployment rate in the year when the study was conducted to its average level in individual countries in the 1990–2004 period. Thus, the relative unemployment rate makes it possible to assess to what extent the current labour market situation

is worse (or better) than a typical one. Among individual-level variables, the following socio-demographic characteristics were included: age, gender, years of education, and household size. Moreover, the models include the respondents' subjective assessment of their position on the social ladder, trade union membership, and the fact of voting in the last elections. Finally, there is also a dummy variable that takes the value of one when a respondent is employed full time or part time, and the value of zero in other cases. In 25 of the 33 analysed countries, the group of the employed constituted more than 50 percent of the respondents.

To precisely capture the heterogeneity of the data set, a multilevel model was estimated, namely the cumulative logit random intercept model [Agresti, 2010: 282–283; Grilli, Rampichini, 2012; Hedeker, 2008]:

$$log \frac{\Pr(Y_{ij} \leq y_c)}{\Pr(Y_{ij} > y_c)} = \alpha_c - (\boldsymbol{x}_{ij}^{'}\boldsymbol{\beta} + u_j) \quad c = 1,\ 2, \tag{1}$$

where i denotes individuals, j represents countries, and c identifies categories of the dependent variable Y_{ij} (the third category is redundant in the model). Vector $\boldsymbol{x}$ consists of explanatory variables defined both at the country and individual levels. It does not contain category index c, which means that the effects of the regressors are constant across response categories. Variable α_c is called a threshold (or cutpoint) between categories c and $c + 1$. The greater the expression $\boldsymbol{x}_{ij}^{'}\boldsymbol{\beta}$ the higher the probability that respondent i belongs to category $c + 1$ or higher. Thus, each parameter β has the same direction of effect as the regression parameter in the ordinary linear regression. Moreover, in order to identify α_1 and α_2, the vector of the explanatory variables does not contain the constant term. Finally, u_j is a random effect representing the unobserved factors at the country level. It affects the thresholds for each country so that the set of thresholds for each j is equal to $\alpha_c - u_j$, $c = 1,\ 2$. The random effect is assumed to have a normal $N(0,\ \sigma_u^2)$ distribution, and its variance σ_u^2 is estimated with the model. This makes it possible to estimate the proportion of the between-countries variance with respect to the total variance, which is called the interclass correlation coefficient, because it is also a measure of the correlation between two responses from the same country:

$$ICC = \frac{\sigma_u^2}{(\sigma_u^2 + \pi^2 / 3)}. \tag{2}$$

Results

The main results of the estimation are presented in Table 3, while the robustness checks are shown in the next subsection. The results indicate that the greatest support for the idea that the government should be responsible for providing a job for everyone, exists in post-socialist countries. Slightly less

support can be observed in countries with French and Scandinavian legal systems, while substantially less support is present in states with German and English legal traditions. These results to a large extent replicate the classical taxonomy of European countries in terms of social policy systems [Esping-Andersen, 1990] and confirm the relationship with employment protection legislation since legal origins are considered as its determinant [Botero *et al*., 2004]. The values of ICC indicate that the between-countries variance constitutes less than 10 percent of the total variance, which suggests that there is little justification to add more country-level variables and that support for the idea to provide a job for everyone is diversified mainly among particular respondents rather than countries.

The results for individual variables indicate that the idea that the government should provide a job for everyone has less support among the employed, older and better educated men than among younger women with a short period of education and without a job. Moreover, the results indicate that providing a job for everyone receives more support from voters with large households and those who believe they are placed at the bottom of the social ladder. This makes it possible to conjecture that the higher the individual's economic insecurity, the higher his or her support for state interventionism [Blekesaune, 2007; Fossati, 2014; Singer, 2013]. What's more, support is greater among respondents who did not vote in the last elections. This last finding suggests that the social pressure on governments to provide a job for everyone may in fact be weaker than suggested by the survey because supporters of this idea are reluctant to be politically active.

In the case of the relative unemployment rate, both its average influence on the dependent variable and its interaction with the employment dummy were assessed (Models 1 and 2 respectively). It turned out that the worse the current labour market situation, the higher the support for the idea of the government providing a job for everyone. However, the interaction with the employed appears to be insignificant. The obtained parameter is only 0.044. As the highest value of the relative unemployment rate in the data set was 1.5 (in the case of Portugal), the highest possible marginal effect of the variable "employed" on the dependent variable was $-0.266 + 0.044 \cdot 1.5 = -0.2$, which is very close to the average effect obtained in Model 1 (–0.22). This indicates that there is no substantial difference between how the employed and other groups of respondents react to the labour market situation. The result is consistent with the second hypothesis that the employed are less supportive than other groups of the idea that the government should provide a job for everyone and that this difference does not depend on the current labour market situation.

Table 3. Estimation results of the cumulative logit random intercept model

Model number	Model 0	Model 1	Model 2
Country level variables			
Legal origins: English	–1.98*** (0.033)	–1.436*** (0.031)	–1.427*** (0.032)
Legal origins: French	–0.397*** (0.032)	–0.279*** (0.032)	–0.411*** (0.032)
Legal origins: German	–2.131*** (0.039)	–2.746*** (0.046)	–1.28*** (0.04)
Legal origins: Scandinavian	–0.314*** (0.041)	–0.71*** (0.04)	–0.717*** (0.04)
Legal origins: Socialist	ref.	ref.	ref.
Relative unemployment rate		0.391*** (0.048)	0.541*** (0.069)
Interactions			
Relative unemp. rate ∗ Employed			0.044 (0.0787)
Individual level variables			
Employed	–0.228*** (0.023)	–0.22*** (0.023)	–0.266*** (0.071)
Woman	0.208*** (0.021)	0.208*** (0.021)	0.21*** (0.021)
Age	–0.005*** (0.001)	–0.005*** (0.001)	–0.005*** (0.001)
Years of education	–0.062*** (0.003)	–0.62*** (0.003)	–0.062*** (0.003)
Trade union membership	0.131*** (0.024)	0.152*** (0.024)	0.128*** (0.024)
Household size	0.025*** (0.006)	0.02*** (0.006)	0.022*** (0.006)
Subjective social group	–0.075*** (0.006)	–0.08*** (0.006)	–0.078*** (0.006)
Voted last elections	–0.162*** (0.025)	–0.159*** (0.025)	–0.156*** (0.025)
Threshold 1	–2.4*** (0.047)	–2.064*** (0.062)	–1.945*** (0.074)
Threshold 2	–0.669*** (0.046)	–0.334*** (0.061)	–0.212*** (0.073)
Variance of random effect	0.203	0.252	0.226
ICC	0.058	0.071	0.064
Log likelihood	–35904.193	–35895.37	–35880.239
Number of countries (level 2 units)	33		
Number of observations (level 1 units)	37022		

Note: asterisks denote significance: *** – 0.01, ** – 0.05, * – 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses.
Source: Own elaboration with the use of the GLLAMM programme [Rabe-Hesketh *et al.*, 2004]. Variables' definitions and sources are shown in Table A3 in the Appendix.

Robustness checks

Several robustness checks were conducted, the results of which are shown in Tables 4–7. The first group of checks (Models 3.1–3.3 in Table 4) concentrated on applying different measures of the labour market situation. The unemployment rate, the average unemployment rate over the period of 1990–2004, and the ratio of the unemployment rate in the year in which the study was conducted to that in the previous year (unemployment rate change) were used.

Among these variables, the interaction term with the unemployment rate and its average level was found to be statistically significant, but only at the 0.1 level. Moreover, the value of the estimated parameter is equal to 0.007 and 0.006, which means that the unemployment rate and its average level would have to be 40% and 47% respectively to make the expectations of the employed indistinguishable from the preferences of other groups. This result may suggest that the difference in preferences between the employed and other groups in countries with a traditionally high level of unemployment is smaller than in countries with a traditionally low level of unemployment, but that does not allow the conclusions stated in the previous section to be rejected. This is further corroborated by analogous estimates (available upon request) for the employment-to-population ratio instead of the unemployment rate.

The next group of checks focused on changes in the way the group of the employed is measured (Models 4.1–5.2 in Table 4). First, only those employed full time were included and once more the interaction term turned out to be insignificant while the obtained parameter was relatively small. Second, instead of employed individuals a broader group of respondents who voted in the last elections was analysed. In this case, the interaction term was found to be significant at the 0.1 level, but once more, even for the highest value of the relative unemployment rate in the data set (1.5), the expectations of the group that voted last elections were still lower than those of other respondents.

Further checks concentrated on excluding particular country groups from the data set using the legal origins variable (Models 6.1–6.5 in Table 5). The main model and its modifications were estimated using data from the third wave of the survey conducted in 1996 (Table 6). Although the difference in expectations between the employed and other groups vary for individual estimates, the main conclusion is the same for all of them: there is a significant difference between the employed and other groups in terms of support for the idea that the government should provide a job for everyone, and this difference does not depend significantly on the labour market situation.

Table 4. Estimation results for robustness checks – testing other independent variables

Model number	Model 3.1	Model 3.2	Model 3.3	Model 4.1	Model 4.2	Model 5.1	Model 5.2
Legal origins: English	–1.71*** (0.03)	–1.59*** (0.03)	–1.4*** (0.04)	–1.44*** (0.03)	–1.44*** (0.03)	–1.33*** (0.03)	–1.43*** (0.03)
Legal origins: French	–1.03*** (0.03)	–0.42*** (0.03)	–0.46*** (0.03)	–0.42*** (0.03)	–0.42*** (0.03)	–0.27*** (0.03)	–0.43*** (0.03)
Legal origins: German	–0.71*** (0.04)	–1.73*** (0.04)	–0.73*** (0.04)	–0.76*** (0.04)	–1.82*** (0.04)	–1.16*** (0.04)	–1.45*** (0.04)
Legal origins: Scandinavian	–0.96*** (0.04)	–1.3*** (0.04)	–1.00*** (0.04)	–0.72*** (0.04)	–0.72*** (0.04)	–0.83*** (0.04)	–0.72*** (0.04)
Legal origins: Socialist	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
Employed	–0.28*** (0.04)	–0.58** (0.26)	–0.28*** (0.04)	–	–	–	–
Full-time employed	–	–	–	–0.21*** (0.023)	–0.27*** (0.07)	–	–
Voted last elections	–0.16*** (0.03)	–0.2*** (0.03)	–0.17*** (0.03)	–0.16*** (0.03)	–0.16*** (0.03)	–0.17*** (0.03)	–0.31*** (0.08)
Unemployment rate	0.09*** (0.00)	–	–	–	–	–	–
Unemployment rate * Employed	0.007* (0.00)	–	–	–	–	–	–
Unemp. rate change	–	–1.86*** (0.23)	–	–	–	–	–
Unemp. rate change * Employed	–	0.388 (0.28)	–	–	–	–	–
Average level of unemp. rate	–	–	0.08*** (0.00)	–	–	–	–
Average level of unemp. rate * Employed	–	–	0.006* (0.00)	–	–	–	–
Relative unemployment rate	–	–	–	0.58*** (0.05)	0.53*** (0.65)	0.12** (0.05)	0.51*** (0.09)
Relative unemployment rate * Full-time employed	–	–	–	–	0.07 (0.07)	–	–
Relative unemployment rate * Voted last elections	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.18* (0.09)
Other individual level variables	⋮	⋮	⋮	⋮	⋮	⋮	⋮
Threshold 1	–1.68*** (0.05)	–3.76*** (0.22)	–1.52*** (0.05)	–1.9*** (0.06)	–1.95*** (0.07)	–1.8*** (0.06)	–1.95*** (0.09)
Threshold 2	0.06 (0.05)	–2.03*** (0.22)	0.21*** (0.05)	–0.18*** (0.06)	–0.22*** (0.07)	–0.07 (0.06)	–0.22*** (0.09)
ICC	0.07	0.07	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06
Number of countries	33						
Number of observations	37022						

Note: see Table 3.

Source: see Table 3.

Table 5. Estimation results for robustness checks – excluding particular country groups

Model number	Model 6.1	Model 6.2	Model 6.3	Model 6.4	Model 6.5
Country level variables					
Legal origins: English	–	–1.39*** (0.03)	–1.413*** (0.032)	–1.434*** (0.032)	–1.042*** (0.415)
Legal origins: French	0.07** (0.036)	–	–0.561*** (0.032)	–0.656*** (0.032)	0.297*** (0.412)
Legal origins: German	–1.294*** (0.042)	–1.69*** (0.046)	–	0.056 (0.048)	–0.61*** (0.049)
Legal origins: Scandinavian	–1.225*** (0.041)	–0.85*** (0.04)	–1.237*** (0.04)	–	ref.
Legal origins: Socialist	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	–
Relative unemployment rate	0.56*** (0.076)	1.3*** (0.09)	0.49*** (0.077)	0.568*** (0.071)	0.614*** (0.078)
Interactions					
Relative unemployment rate * Employed	0.05 (0.09)	–0.074 (0.1)	0.12 (0.095)	0.091 (0.082)	0.044 (0.087)
Individual level variables					
Employed	–0.26*** (0.08)	–0.195*** (0.09)	–0.319*** (0.08)	–0.271*** (0.075)	–0.268*** (0.08)
Women	0.204*** (0.024)	0.186*** (0.02)	0.218*** (0.022)	0.192*** (0.022)	0.238*** (0.023)
Age	–0.003*** (0.001)	–0.004*** (0.001)	–0.006*** (0.001)	–0.006*** (0.001)	–0.005*** (0.001)
Years of education	–0.06*** (0.003)	–0.07*** (0.003)	–0.062*** (0.003)	–0.062*** (0.003)	–0.059*** (0.003)
Trade union membership	0.129*** (0.028)	0.147*** (0.028)	0.153*** (0.026)	0.145*** (0.025)	0.113*** (0.027)
Household size	0.021*** (0.007)	0.018** (0.001)	0.019*** (0.007)	0.019*** (0.007)	0.026*** (0.006)
Subjective social group	–0.087*** (0.007)	–0.96*** (0.006)	–0.08*** (0.005)	–0.073*** (0.006)	–0.067*** (0.006)
Voted last elections	–0.164*** (0.029)	–0.185*** (0.03)	–0.168*** (0.027)	–0.136*** (0.026)	–0.139*** (0.028)
Threshold 1	–1.989*** (0.084)	–1.06*** (0.089)	–1.97*** (0.08)	–1.9*** (0.077)	–0.535*** (0.089)
Threshold 2	–0.228*** (0.08)	0.714*** (0.089)	–0.276*** (0.079)	–0.15* (0.076)	1.146*** (0.089)
ICC	0.06	0.05	0.07	0.08	0.07
Number of countries (level 2 units)	25	24	28	29	26
Number of obs. (level 1 units)	27424	26282	31602	33053	29727

Note: see Table 3.
Source: see Table 3.

Table 6. Robustness checks' results – data from the third wave of the survey (1996)

Model number	Model 7.1	Model 7.2	Model 7.3	Model 7.4	Model 7.5
Legal origins: English	–1.82*** (0.04)	–1.87*** (0.04)	–1.89*** (0.03)	–1.75*** (0.04)	–1.99*** (0.03)
Legal origins: French	–0.41*** (0.03)	–0.4*** (0.03)	–0.83*** (0.04)	–0.44*** (0.04)	–0.63*** (0.04)
Legal origins: German	–1.57*** (0.04)	–1.53*** (0.04)	–1.27*** (0.04)	–1.38*** (0.04)	–0.82*** (0.04)
Legal origins: Scandinavian	–1.92*** (0.06)	–2.2*** (0.06)	–0.91*** (0.05)	–0.89*** (0.05)	0.69*** (0.05)
Legal origins: Socialist	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
Employed	–0.26*** (0.025)	–0.26** (0.12)	–0.27*** (0.05)	–0.14 (0.26)	–0.25*** (0.05)
Relative unemployment rate[a]	0.2** (0.08)	–0.03 (0.11)	–	–	–
Relative unemp. rate[a] * Employed	–	0.01 (0.12)	–	–	–
Unemployment rate	–	–	0.03*** (0.00)	–	–
Unemployment rate * Employed	–	–	0.001 (0.005)	–	–
Unemp. rate change	–	–	–	0.72*** (0.22)	–
Unemp. rate change * Employed	–	–	–	–0.13 (0.26)	–
Average level of unemp. rate[a]	–	–	–	–	0.06*** (0.01)
Average level of unemp. rate[a] * Employed	–	–	–	–	–0.000 (0.004)
Other individual level variables	⋮	⋮	⋮	⋮	⋮
Threshold 1	–1.67*** (0.09)	–1.9*** (0.11)	–1.65*** (0.05)	–1.1*** (0.22)	–1.53*** (0.05)
Threshold 2	0.06 (0.09)	–0.16 (0.11)	0.08 (0.05)	0.64*** (0.22)	0.2*** (0.05)
ICC	0.052	0.055	0.057	0.025	0.02
Number of countries	24				
Number of observations	30429				

[a] Calculated for the period 1991–1995.

Note: see Table 3.

Source: see Table 3.

Table 7. Robustness checks' results – data from the fifth wave of the survey (2016)

Model number	Model 8.1	Model 8.2	Model 8.3	Model 8.4	Model 8.5
Legal origins: English	–1.21*** (0.00)	–1.65*** (0.04)	–1.82*** (0.04)	–1.45*** (0.04)	–1.6*** (0.04)
Legal origins: French	–0.45*** (0.00)	–0.62*** (0.04)	–0.62*** (0.04)	–0.32*** (0.03)	–0.11*** (0.03)
Legal origins: German	–1.44*** (0.00)	–1.47*** (0.03)	–1.5*** (0.04)	–1.48*** (0.04)	–1.12*** (0.04)
Legal origins: Scandinavian	–1.5*** (0.04)	–1.178*** (0.04)	–1.34*** (0.04)	–2.54*** (0.05)	–1.42*** (0.05)
Legal origins: Socialist	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
Employed	–0.22*** (0.03)	–0.12 (0.08)	–0.15*** (0.04)	–0.96*** (0.22)	–0.14*** (0.05)
Relative unemployment rate[a]	–0.35*** (0.05)	–0.02 (0.07)	–	–	–
Relative unemp. rate[a] * Employed	–	–0.12 (0.09)	–	–	–
Unemployment rate	–	–	0.00 (0.01)	–	–
Unemployment rate * Employed	–	–	–0.01** (0.00)	–	–
Unemp. rate change	–	–	–	1.00*** (0.18)	–
Unemp. rate change * Employed	–	–	–	0.79*** (0.24)	–
Average level of unemp. rate[a]	–	–	–	–	–0.01** (0.00)
Average level of unemp. rate[a] * Employed	–	–	–	–	–0.01* (0.00)
Other individual level variables	⋮	⋮	⋮	⋮	⋮
Threshold 1	–1.83*** (0.06)	–2.06*** (0.07)	–2.05*** (0.05)	–0.79*** (0.17)	–1.73*** (0.06)
Threshold 2	–0.09 (0.05)	–0.31*** (0.07)	–0.31*** (0.05)	0.95*** (0.17)	0.18 (0.06)
ICC	0.047	0.052	0.052	0.038	0.064
Number of countries	26				
Number of observations	28890				

[a] Calculated for the period 2000–2014.
Note: see Table 3.
Source: see Table 3.

Finally, as the last check, estimates were carried out for the last wave dating from 2016 (Table 7). As not all the observations for this wave have been published as of this writing (June 2018), these results must be treated with caution. They turned out to be ambiguous and quite surprising because they indicate (Models 8.3 and 8.5) that the higher the unemployment rate

(or its average value), the greater the differences among the employed and other groups of voters. At the same time, they indicate (Model 8.4) that the expectations of the employed may be closer to those of other groups after a rise in the unemployment rate. Although these models should be re-estimated once the final data set from the fifth wave is published, even those preliminary results indicate that there are significant differences between the employed and other groups as far as the role of the state in the labour market is concerned.

Conclusion

A simple model indicating that formal institutions are reformed by the government in order to adjust them to voter preferences fails to explain why some countries sustain institutions that have a negative labour market impact. In tackling this problem, the literature offers approaches such as a cross-country regression between labour market institutions and other country-specific characteristics. Also available is a detailed analysis of individual preferences concerning government policy. However, there is a lack of studies that would try to assess to what extent differences in these preferences have shaped the heterogeneity of labour market institutions and outcomes among countries over a decade or two. This study aimed to fill this gap.

The results indicate that the more supportive voters in various countries were back around 1996 for the idea of the government providing a job for everyone, the worse labour market outcomes can be observed nowadays. Two complementary explanations of this relationship are offered in this study.

First, it has been found that only three of the 20 labour market institution indicators analysed turned out to be correlated with the societal expectations expressed around 1996. Among these, a correlation between the decreasing strictness of permanent employment contract protection and increasing expenditure on active labour market policies was interpreted as governmental action consistent with people expecting the government to provide a job for everyone. However, these efforts were insubstantial because the societal expectations were found to be significantly correlated with employment protection legislation in 2013, in much the same way as in 1996.

Second, the Role of Government survey shows that support for the idea of the government providing a job for everyone is much smaller among the employed (who in many countries constitute the majority of respondents) than in other groups. Moreover, this difference does not significantly depend on the current labour market situation. In consequence, contrary to some theoretical models, the study suggests that, even during an economic downturn, there are substantial differences among voters as to what government policy should look like on the labour market. This hinders substantial reform.

The main recommendation for further research is to repeat the analysis when the final results of the fifth wave of the Role of Government survey are available. This will make it possible to assess to what extent individual expectations have changed since the global crisis. It would be also recommended

to compute more detailed indicators of occupational and local labour markets to more precisely gauge respondents' sense of job insecurity.

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Appendix

Table A1. Countries and regions covered by the ISSP Role of Government surveys

	Wave	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	Wave	2nd	3rd	4th	5th
	Year	1990	1996	2006	2016[a]	Year	1990	1996	2006	2016[a]
	No. of surveys	11	26	35	30	No. of surveys	11	26	35	30
Countries and regions included in the analysis presented in the article	Australia	X	X	X		Korea, Rep.			X	X
	Bulgaria		X			Latvia		X	X	X
	Canada		X	X		Lithuania				X
	Chile			X	X	Netherlands			X	
	Croatia			X	X	New Zealand		X	X	X
	Cyprus		X			Norway	X	X	X	X
	Czech Rep.		X	X	X	Philippines		X	X	X
	Denmark			X		Poland		X	X	
	Dominican Rep.			X		Portugal			X	
	Finland			X	X	Russia		X	X	
	France		X	X	X	Slovakia				X
	Georgia				X	Slovenia		X	X	X
	Germany West	X	X	X	X	South Africa			X	
	Great Britain	X	X	X	X	Spain		X	X	X
	Hungary	X	X	X	X	Sweden		X	X	X
	Iceland				X	Switzerland		X	X	X
	Ireland	X	X	X		Taiwan			X	X
	Israel-Jews	X[b]	X	X	X	Thailand				X
	Italy	X	X			United States	X	X	X	X
	Japan		X	X	X	Uruguay			X	
Excluded	Denmark				X[c]	Venezuela			X	
	Germany East	X	X	X	X	Northern Ireland	X			
	Israel-Arabs		X	X	X	Venezuela				X[d]

[a] – as of this writing (June 2018) only an initial data release from the 5th wave was available.
[b] – in 1990 the survey was not conducted for the Israel-Jews and Israel-Arabs groups separately.
[c] – the observations concerning the respondents' age for Denmark in the 5th wave were not consistent with observations from other countries and were not published in the data set.
[d] – the values of the unemployment rate were unavailable for Venezuela in 2016.

Source: Own elaboration based on the ISSP Research Group [1992, 1999, 2008, 2018].

Table A2. The relationship of support for providing a job for everyone and other questions in the fourth wave of the Role of Government survey (2006)

Question	Answers	On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the government's responsibility to provide a job for everyone who wants one?				Contingency coefficient
		Definitely should be	Probably should be	Probably should not be	Definitely should not be	
Country (% in rows)	Australia	13.5%	29.5%	36.1%	20.8%	0.438***
	Canada	14.3%	24.5%	33.6%	27.7%	
	Chile	32.0%	39.9%	22.8%	5.3%	
	Croatia	63.6%	30.3%	4.0%	2.1%	
	Czech Republic	39.7%	38.2%	13.7%	8.5%	
	Denmark	21.6%	37.2%	28.9%	12.3%	
	Dominican Rep.	48.8%	30.2%	13.4%	7.5%	
	Finland	23.9%	33.5%	26.4%	16.2%	
	France	32.7%	31.1%	20.4%	15.9%	
	Germany (West)	29.8%	32.7%	28.4%	9.1%	
	Great Britain	17.1%	38.9%	29.6%	14.5%	
	Hungary	52.5%	38.3%	8.3%	0.9%	
	Ireland	24.5%	37.9%	19.1%	18.5%	
	Israel (Jews)	39.4%	36.6%	17.8%	6.2%	
	Japan	16.3%	35.4%	30.6%	17.6%	
	Korea. Rep.	20.8%	49.3%	25.0%	4.8%	
	Latvia	39.2%	43.9%	13.2%	3.8%	
	Netherlands	20.3%	37.3%	25.4%	17.0%	
	New Zealand	12.1%	25.3%	33.8%	28.8%	
	Norway	41.2%	37.5%	16.6%	4.7%	
	Philippines	62.7%	29.3%	6.2%	1.8%	
	Poland	57.8%	31.3%	8.9%	2.0%	
	Portugal	49.6%	35.9%	10.1%	4.5%	
	Russia	63.6%	29.6%	5.5%	1.3%	
	Slovenia	47.5%	40.9%	9.3%	2.3%	
	South Africa	63.3%	28.7%	4.8%	3.2%	
	Spain	42.8%	39.3%	11.9%	6.0%	
	Sweden	28.6%	30.3%	28.3%	12.9%	
	Switzerland	10.4%	41.0%	40.5%	8.1%	
	Taiwan	48.4%	39.6%	10.4%	1.6%	
	United States	16.0%	23.7%	34.1%	26.2%	
	Uruguay	35.1%	36.7%	16.6%	11.7%	
	Venezuela	90.4%	7.2%	0.8%	1.6%	

Question	Answers	On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the government's responsibility to provide a job for everyone who wants one?				Contingency coefficient
		Definitely should be	Probably should be	Probably should not be	Definitely should not be	
On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the government's responsibility to: (% in columns)	Keep prices under control					0.449***
	– definitely should be	75.3%	40.2%	27.4%	32.9%	
	– probably should be	20.4%	50.4%	48.7%	31%	
	– probably should not be	3%	7.8%	20.2%	17.4%	
	– definitely should not be	1.3%	1.6%	3.7%	18.7%	
	Provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed					0.444***
	– definitely should be	53.3%	19%	10.6%	11.6%	
	– probably should be	32.4%	59.1%	47.1%	33.8%	
	– probably should not be	10%	17.8%	34.3%	29.8%	
	– definitely should not be	4.3%	4.1%	7.9%	24.8%	
	Reduce income differences between the rich and poor					0.42***
	– definitely should be	63.4%	35.2%	24%	22.9%	
	– probably should be	23.7%	46%	35.5%	22.4%	
	– probably should not be	8.6%	14.4%	30.1%	23.7%	
	– definitely should not be	4.3%	4.3%	10.4%	31.1%	
	Provide industry with the help it needs to grow					0.394***
	– definitely should be	58.6%	23.9%	19.6%	24.4%	
	– probably should be	33.6%	61.2%	51.3%	41.8%	
	– probably should not be	6.2%	12.9%	25.1%	21.5%	
	– definitely should not be	1.5%	2%	4%	12.3%	
Please show whether you would like to see more or less government spending in the following areas. Remember that saying much more may require a tax increase (% in columns)	Old-age pensions					0.277***
	– spend much more	42.6%	24%	17.2%	17.6%	
	– spend more	39.1%	46.8%	41.6%	35.6%	
	– spend the same as now	15.8%	26.5%	37.2%	38.4%	
	– spend less	1.9%	2.2%	3.4%	6.2%	
	– spend much less	0.6%	0.5%	0.6%	2.2%	
	Unemployment benefits					0.352***
	– spend much more	25.3%	9.9%	4.8%	4.3%	
	– spend more	33.6%	32.1%	18.3%	11.5%	
	– spend the same as now	28.6%	41.9%	49.8%	42.6%	
	– spend less	8.7%	12.6%	21.2%	26.4%	
	– spend much less	3.8%	3.6%	5.8%	15.2%	

Question	Answers	On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the government's responsibility to provide a job for everyone who wants one?				Contingency coefficient
		Definitely should be	Probably should be	Probably should not be	Definitely should not be	
Here are some things the government might do for the economy.	Support declining industries to protect jobs					0.316***
	– strongly in favour of	37.9%	20.3%	15%	16%	
	– in favour of	40.8%	47.5%	37.4%	26.7%	
	– neither for nor against	11.5%	19.4%	23.8%	20.3%	
	– against	7.3%	10.5%	20%	25.5%	
	– strongly against	2.5%	2.2%	3.9%	11.6%	
Please show which actions you are in favour of and which you are against (% in columns)	Reducing the working week to create more jobs					0.258***
	– strongly in favour of	22.4%	11.3%	8.4%	9%	
	– in favour of	30.8%	33.6%	24.1%	17.4%	
	– neither for nor against	18.5%	25.8%	25.4%	18.4%	
	– against	19.4%	21.9%	30.5%	30.3%	
	– strongly against	8.9%	7.4%	11.6%	24.8%	

Note: *** – 0.01 significance level.
Source: Own elaboration based on the ISSP Research Group [2008].

Table A3. Variables and their sources

Variable	Short description	Source
Main dependent variable:		
–	Answers to the question: *On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the government's responsibility to provide a job for everyone who wants one?* where the respondents had the following choice: *Definitely should be, Probably should be, Probably should not be, Definitely should not be*.	ISSP Research Group [1999, 2008, 2018]
Labour market outcomes:		
Employment to pop. ratio	Employment to population ratio	*ILOSTAT* [ILO, 2017]
Labour force par. rate	Labour force participation rate	
Long-term unemp. rate	Unemployed one year or more as a percentage of the labour force	
NEET	The proportion of youth (15–24 years) not in employment, education or training	
Unemployment rate	Unemployment rate	
Youth unemployment rate	Unemployment rate among youth (15–24 years)	

Variable	Short description	Source
Employment security	The % of respondents who answered *Very easy* or *Fairly easy* to the question *How difficult or easy do you think it would be for you to find a job at least as good as your current one?*	*Work Orientations IV* [ISSP Research Group, 2017]
Job security	The % of respondents who answered *I don't worry at all* to the question *To what extent, if at all, do you worry about the possibility of losing your job?*	
Labour market institutional indicators:		
ALMP	Expenditures on active measures of labour market policies and public employment services as % of GDP	Eurostat; Lehmann and Muravyev [2012]; OECD
CIRI	Indicator of the extent to which workers enjoy in practice the internationally recognised rights at work. It takes three values: 0, 1 and 2, where 0 means that workers' rights were severely restricted, while 2 means that were fully protected	Cingranelli, Richards, and Clay [2014]
Coord. of wage setting	Coordination of wage setting, values from 1 to 5, where: 1 – wage bargaining, confined largely to individual firms, 5 – maximum or minimum wage rates/increases based on centralised bargaining	Visser [2016]
EPL	OECD overall index of Employment Protection Legislation, version II, the higher the values are, the more restrictive the law is (scale 0–6)	Kajzer [2007]; Muravyev [2014]; OECD
EPR	Sub-component of EPL that measures the protection of employees on regular/indefinite contracts	Muravyev [2014]; OECD
EPT	Sub-component of EPL that measures the protection of temporary employment	
EPC	Sub-component of EPL that measures additional costs and procedures involved in collective dismissals	
GC hiring and firing GC labour relations GC pay to productivity GC wage setting	Indicators based on the following questions from the Executive Opinion Survey: In your country, to what extent do regulations allow flexible hiring and firing of workers? [1 = not at all; 7 = to a great extent] In your country, how would you characterise labour-employer relations? [1=generally confrontational; 7=generally cooperative] In your country, to what extent is pay related to worker productivity? [1 = not at all; 7 = to a great extent] In your country, how are wages generally set? [1 = by a centralised bargaining process; 7 = by each individual company]	*The Global Competitiveness Report*, World Economic Forum
LFI	Labour Freedom Index – a sub-component of the Index of Economic Freedom, the higher the values are, the more freedom on the labour market is offered	*Index of Economic Freedom*, Heritage Foundation
LMR	Labour Market Regulations – a sub-component of the Economic Freedom of the World index. Higher values mean more freedom.	*Economic Freedom of the World*, Fraser Institute

Variable	Short description	Source
Labour rights Labour rights law Labour rights practice	Indices that capture violations of internationally recognised labour rights. *LR_law* measures whether labour rights exist in individual countries. *LR_pract* counts incidents of breaking existing laws. *LR* is an aggregated index of these two. Higher values indicate more violations.	Mosley [2011]
Min. wage to average	Ratio of minimum wage to mean wage	Aleksynska and Schindler [2011]
Min. wage to mean	Ratio of minimum wage to mean wage	ILO [2017]; OECD
Min. wage to median	Ratio of minimum wage to median wage	OECD
National min. wage	National minimum wage, values from 0 to 2, where: 0 – no statutory wage, 1 – statutory minimum wage in some sectors (occupations, regions) only, 2 – statutory national minimum wage exists	Visser [2016]
PLMP	Expenditure on passive measures of labour market policies as % of GDP	OECD
PTR	Participation Tax Rate – a ratio of additional income lost due to tax payments and benefits reduction when an agent's status is changed from "out of work" to "in work" with the gross wage equal to 33% of the average wage	OECD
Tax	Tax wedge estimated for an average full-time worker in the industry sector who is not married, receives 67% of the average earnings, and has no child	Lehmann and Muravyev [2012]; OECD
Tax N.	The sum of the payroll tax rate, the income tax rate and the consumption tax rate	Layard, Nickell, and Jackman [2005]
Unemployment benefits cov.	Unemployment benefits coverage (ratio of UB recipients to the number of unemployed)	Aleksynska and Schindler [2011]
Unemployment benefits GRR	Unemployment benefits gross replacement rate, average over first 2 years of unemployment	Aleksynska and Schindler [2011]
Unemployment benefits NRR	Unemployment benefits net replacement rate for a wage equal to 67% of a mean wage, 5 years' average	OECD
Union cov.	Adjusted bargaining coverage rate: proportion of all wage earners with right to bargaining	Visser [2016]
Union density	Union density rate, net union membership as a proportion of wage earners in employment (in %)	Lehmann and Muravyev [2012]; Visser [2016]
Independent variables in the multilevel model:		
Legal origins	Dummy variables indicating the legal origins: English, French, German, Scandinavian or Socialist respectively	La Porta *et al.* [1999]
Average level of unemployment	The average is calculated over the period of 1990–2004 (for some countries the period is shorter due to data availability)	ILO [2017]
Relative unemployment rate	The ratio of the unemployment rate in the year when the survey was conducted to its average level in individual countries in the 1990–2004 period	
Unemployment rate	Unemployment rate in the year when the study was conducted	
Unemp. rate change	The ratio of the unemployment rate in the year when the study was conducted to that in the previous year	

Variable	Short description	Source
Age	Respondents' age, country mean centred	ISSP Research Group [1999, 2008, 2018]
Employed	Current employment status: 1 – employed full time or part time, 0 – employed less than part time, helping family member, unemployed or inactive	
Full-time employed	Current employment status: 1 – employed full time, 0 – employed less than full time, helping family member, unemployed or inactive	
Household size	Total number of people living in a household	
Subjective social group	Self-placement on a social group ladder from 1 (the lowest) to 10 (the highest)	
Trade union membership	1 – if the respondent is or was a member of a trade union, 0 – if respondent never was a member	
Voted last elections	1 – if respondent voted in last elections, 0 – if respondent did not vote or was not eligible	
Women	1 – if respondent is a woman, 0 – if respondent is a man	
Years of education	Respondents' years of education, country mean centred	

Source: Own elaboration.

OCZEKIWANIA SPOŁECZNE WOBEC PEŁNEGO ZATRUDNIENIA. OCENA ICH WPŁYWU NA INSTYTUCJE ORAZ SYTUACJĘ NA RYNKU PRACY

Streszczenie

Okazuje się, że im silniejsze było w 1996 roku społeczne oczekiwanie, aby rządy poszczególnych krajów zapewniły pełne zatrudnienie, tym gorsza jest obecnie w tych krajach sytuacja na rynkach pracy. W artykule zaproponowano dwie komplementarne hipotezy, inspirowane teorią wyboru publicznego, które mogą pomóc wyjaśnić to zjawisko: (1) oczekiwania społeczne nie były skorelowane z reformami instytucji rynku pracy przeprowadzonymi w kolejnych dwóch dekadach; (2) poparcie dla idei zapewnienia przez rząd pełnego zatrudnienia jest niższe wśród osób pracujących (którzy w wielu badanych krajach stanowili większość wyborców) niż w przypadku pozostałych grup społecznych i różnica ta nie zależy od sytuacji panującej na rynku pracy. Analiza empiryczna bazuje na zestawie 29 wskaźników instytucji rynku pracy i obejmuje kraje, które w latach 1996–2016 wzięły udział w badaniu ankietowym pt. *Oczekiwania wobec rządu* (ang. *Role of government*) – będącego częścią Międzynarodowego programu sondaży społecznych (ISSP). Uzyskane rezultaty są w dużej mierze zgodne z przyjętymi hipotezami.

Słowa kluczowe: instytucje rynku pracy, polityka rynku pracy, pełne zatrudnienie, oczekiwania społeczne

Kody klasyfikacji JEL: D78, J21, L51